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ASSESSMENT IMPACT OF RUSSIA-UKRAINE WAR ON DISRUPTIONS OF GLOBAL GOOD SUPPLY CHAINS FOR FOOD TRADE IN AFRICA

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Abstract
Russia's invasion of Ukraine has shocked global good supply and food trade markets. While there is uncertainty over how the war will develop, it is certain that its ramifications will be both long-lasting and far-reaching for societies around the world. Both Russia and Ukraine are important to global good supply and food trade markets, particularly for energy, food and fertilizers. Economic sanctions, trade restrictions and policy interventions introduced by national and regional governments, in response to the invasion, have led to a rapid 'spike' in prices for these commodities. This trend has been further exacerbated by disruption to food supply chains and fears of potential supply. Before the war, they are been excessive demand in energy, food and fertilizer markets was already running ahead of supplies and driving up prices. Following the COVID-19 pandemic, a global cost-of-living crisis had ensued, characterized by rising levels of energy and food poverty. These conditions worsened Russia-Ukraine war. High prices for energy and food pose immediate threats to human security, particularly among low-income and vulnerable populations in all economies and against a backdrop of post-pandemic inflation and limited fiscal capacity. These threats may also trigger cascading risks, which may combine with existing socio-economic and political stresses to spark unrest and even further conflict in other parts of the world. The potential for coincident price or supply shocks including as a consequence of climate change further amplifies the risk. African countries must invest now to build the long-term resilience of societies and economies against global shocks of the scale that has been witnessed over the past two years, firstly the COVID-19 pandemic and now Russia's war in Ukraine. They should take measures that mitigate both the ongoing impacts of the situation in Ukraine and the longer-term risks of market disruption.

Key words: *Assessment, Russia-Ukraine War, Disruptions, Global Food Supply, Food Trade*

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1. INTRODUCTION

Bilateral relations are meant to enhance the dynamics of mutual cooperation and interests among nations concerned. Increasing trade growth has contributed to deepening integration of the world agro-food global value chains and the world agro-food system. The disruptions in food trade directly expose agricultural markets, and increases in oil prices impact food production and transportation costs. Given the disconnectedness of global food markets, shocks in Russia and Ukraine, both major world food producers and exporters, would impact food supplies. Furthermore, the importance of the Black Sea region to the global production and trade of major staples implies that the impact of the Russia-Ukraine crisis on food trade, food prices and food security transcends beyond the borders of the two countries. The disruption of global food supplies from the region leaves importing countries from Africa, Asia and the Middle East vulnerable to disruptions in supply, and soaring prices of major cereal grains (OECD, 2019).

Since Russian tanks rolled into Ukraine on February 24, 2022, the global community has become more and more fragile; widening the rifts in global peace and security and worsening relations between Russia and the West. The impact of the war is felt because of the spikes in energy prices and food prices driven by the war-linked supply chain and trade-related disruptions. The Russia-Ukraine war is still underway despite various efforts by the international community for de-escalation and an end to the war. In spite of the fierce sanctions the West has imposed on Russia to send indirect signals to end the war and various negotiations underway between Russian and Ukrainian leaders, the war continues.

Hopes of seeing the global economy emerge and stable out of the COVID-19 pandemic, which resulted in a severe collapse of GDP growth by an estimated –3.5% in 2020, are now being delayed due to the escalating war between Russia and Ukraine, thereby, compounding the woes of the global economy and especially on African economies. The war has accelerated inflation across the world, as well as blurred the global economic outlook. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) revised its projections in April, reflecting that global growth will be slow from an estimated 6.1% in 2021 to 3.6% in both 2022 and 2023, which are 0.8 and 0.2 percentage points lower than projected in January (IMF, 2022). Before the conflict erupted, Africa was still 'stuck in transition' as its slowly recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic tracked below pre-pandemic levels and now, the consequences of the war threaten to regress the gains made (WHO Africa, 2021). This war is already showing signs of shifting attention from the pandemic's effect on the continent to rearmament diverting billions of dollars away from other critical sustainable development issues including tackling poverty, inequality, and the climate crisis. The vulnerabilities of African economies are likely to deepen further. The war will have dire economic consequences on lower-income households globally but especially in low-income African countries.

It is general fact that Russia and Ukraine are major food exporters of major grains (such as wheat, barley, corn etc) and vegetable oils, the war will directly disrupt global food markets and affect food export patterns. The war directly reduces food exports from both countries affecting global food supplies. Both countries are important sources of wheat imports for several countries in Africa, such as Egypt, Nigeria and Sudan more than 70 percent. In 2020, Egypt and Sudan were some of the largest Russian and Ukrainian wheat importers. African countries that heavily depend on food imports from Russia and Ukraine, especially in North Africa (Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia), face the greatest risk of not getting their imports from the two countries. The impacts of the Russia-Ukraine war are already threatening food availability in countries that depend heavily on grains and other food exports from these two countries (Puma & Konar, 2022).

The war in Ukraine, is like a food basket of Europe, which has significant impacts on food import-dependent countries (such as Africa). However, the disruptions in food supply chains, increases in global energy and shipping costs, closure of ports affected areas, and limited availability of shipping vessels and containers. Combined, the two countries account for between 25 and 30 percent of global wheat, barley and corn exports and about 80 percent of global vegetable oils (Puma & Konar, 2022). Similarly, the war-induced disruptions in food production would further affect future food supplies from the conflict-affected areas such as the eastern parts of Ukraine, which is the food basket of the country. Most of Ukraine's wheat (about 35 percent) is grown in the east, where fighting has been ongoing since the outbreak of the war (Duho, Abankwah, Agbozo, & Yonmearu, 2022). The uncertainties on food production activities in the conflict-affected areas imply that if the fighting is prolonged, the country's food production will decrease (especially wheat and corn), negatively affecting global food supplies. Tight global food supplies will continue to push food prices up with severe impacts on the accessibility of food by the poor in many developing countries. It is on this note the researchers was inspired to investigate on assessment impact of Russia-Ukraine war on disruptions of global good supply chains for food trade in African.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

Russia ships its grain from ports in the Black Sea, which is also a major conduit of international grain shipments from Ukraine, one of the top exporters of wheat, barley, maize, sunflower and other oilseeds. The main grain export ports include Chornomorsk, Kherson, Mykolayiv, Odessa and Yuzhny (Devitt, Stolyarov, & Zinets, 2022). The disruptions of the Black Sea ports' logistical activities and normal functioning will impact exports from Russia, Ukraine, and neighbouring countries (Bulgaria, Kazakhstan, and Romania). Export deliveries will either be cancelled or delayed. The disruptions of the normal functioning of the Black Sea ports and grain exports from the region have a significant impact on global food supplies, and tight global supplies would further fuel food price increases around the world.

Ukrainian cities, including port cities key to the country's agricultural exports, have been battered and taken by Russia missiles and airstrikes, with shipping in and out of the country largely grounded. The conflict has throttled exports from one of the world's largest suppliers of grains (Horner, MacDonald, & Deng, 2022). Following the Russian invasion on 24 February 2022, Ukraine's military suspended commercial shipping at its ports, raising fears of supply disruption from the largest grain and oilseeds exporters. Earlier, Russia had ordered the Azov Sea closed to commercial vessels until further notice (Devitt, Stolyarov, & Zinets, 2022). In addition, shipping stopped in the Azov Sea, an extension of the Black Sea to the east of Crimea, which exports up to 18 million tons of grains each year. Ships have also been banned from passing through the narrow Kerch Strait into the shallow sea, while dozens of ships (including bulk carriers that transport grains) had anchored in the strait (Horner, MacDonald, & Deng, 2022).

The disruptions of the normal functioning of these ports affect food exports from the two countries and affect global food supplies, given their significant share of global exports. The ongoing conflict has already led to the closure of some Ukrainian ports. Global food supplies will be affected if the conflict continues and further obstructs normal port transportation activities. Damage to port infrastructure due to the fighting, or a Russian naval blockade, would further threaten larger Ukrainian ports around Mykolaiv and Odessa, which handle upwards of 50 million metric tons of grain each year and are important to the country's agricultural sector (Horner, MacDonald, & Deng, 2022).

Food production in Ukraine is more directly impacted by the war, with farming activities disrupted. Some farmers might not start any activities with the planting season starting in a few weeks. Although farming activities in Russia are not directly disrupted by the war, the sanctions imposed on the country are already affecting the economy and will also impact food exports. An additional risk is if Russia restricts exports to keep domestic food prices low. This could further impact global food supplies and prices.

Ukraine, NATO, and the Russia Invasion

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was created in 1949 by the United States, Canada, and several Western European nations to provide collective security against the Soviet Union. Since its establishment, it has been guaranteeing the freedom and security of its members through political and military means. This purpose is pursued with a focus on collective defence, crisis management and corporative security strategy. One underlying distinctive principle of NATO is that an "attack against one or several of its members is considered as an attack against all." (Duho, Taylor, Amamoo, & Amamoo, 2021). NATO membership is open to European countries and in recent times there have been new members like North Macedonia in 2020 while other countries like Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, and Ukraine have applied for membership. Sweden and Finland are also making efforts to bid for membership with NATO.

The bone of contention has been Ukraine's application for membership with NATO, with Russia expressing concerns that since they share borders with Ukraine, such an alliance is tantamount to the encroachment of Russia's area of political influence as eastern European countries join NATO. Russia's demand is for Ukraine never to be allowed to join NATO as it will bring NATO's influence and presence too close to its backyard. Russia has demanded that the West gives a legally binding guarantee that NATO will not hold any military activity in Eastern Europe and Ukraine. Despite these demands, Ukraine has been making efforts to speed up the process for admission into NATO based on lessons from how Russia annexed Crimea in 2014. Tensions between the two former republics have been there for a long time. The tension escalated in January 2021 when the Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy urged the US president, Joe Biden, for Ukraine to join the NATO. This request angered Russia and the country started sending troops near its Ukraine border. Using Belarus as a conduit, the military invasion and subsequent war on Ukraine was evident (Duho *et al*., 2022).

On the back of these, Russia launched a military operation in Ukraine on Thursday, February 24, 2022, with explosions heard across the country, followed by a "full-scale invasion". Despite the devastating effect of this war on Ukraine, Russia through its media has been projecting that it is merely a 'special military operation’. Prior to these, various US intelligence reports have warned and disclosed the intentions of Russia although these were denied on several occasions. The US threatened severe sanctions covering financial and economic related punitive measures if Russia invaded Ukraine. The invasion and subsequent war on Ukraine have led to various financial and economic sanctions against Russia. For instance, there have been economic sanctions in the form of bans on new investment in Russia, severe sanctions on Russian financial institutions (Alfa Bank and Sberbank), sanctions on critical major state-owned enterprises, sanctions on government officials and diplomats, sanctions on various Russian oligarchs, and trade-related actions, among others (Duho, *et al*., 2022). Despite over 5 multiple rounds of sanctions from Europe, and the US,19 the war seems not to end while Russia tend to adjust as well as court new relations with countries like China and India to reduce the devastating impact of the sanctions on its economy. As the war is still ongoing, new sanctions continue to emerge, but the Russian President opines that the sanctions are an own goal to the West arguing that it has deteriorated the economies of the West.

Implications of trade disruptions in the Black Sea region for African countries

Given that Russia and Ukraine are major food exporters of major grains (such as wheat, barley and corn) and vegetable oils, the war will directly disrupt global food markets and affect food export patterns. The war directly reduces food exports from both countries affecting global food supplies. Russia and Ukraine are important sources of wheat and other grains imports for several countries in Africa, about 70 percent grains has been import to Nigeria and Sudan. In 2020, Egypt and Sudan were some of the largest Russian and Ukrainian wheat importers. African countries that heavily depend on food imports from Russia and Ukraine, especially in North Africa (Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia), face the greatest risk of not getting their imports from the two countries (Puma & Konar, 2022).

Considering that Russia and Ukraine are dominant exporters, finding replacement suppliers will not be easy in the short term. The global production shortfalls in food supplies due to drought conditions affecting major food producing regions in South America, such as Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay, make it challenging to increase import volumes from alternative sources. Furthermore, the increased demand from countries seeking alternative suppliers and any restrictive export measures by major export countries will significantly affect global food supplies and keep the upward pressure on food prices.

In Southern Africa, the January edition of the Food Security Monitor projected dry conditions in the central and western parts of the region, which significantly affected cropping activities and harvest potential at the end of the main cropping season. In addition to the delayed season, parts of the region, Madagascar, Malawi and Mozambique were devasted by the Tropical Storm Ana late January, which destroyed livelihoods, infrastructure and agricultural activities. The rainfall conditions have contributed to mixed crop conditions in the ongoing main cropping season and will significantly impact the potential seasonal harvests in the affected areas and the region. With disruptions in global food markets around the Black Sea region inevitable, domestic and regional food prices will continue on an upward trend in areas already experiencing food insecurity and rising food prices (UN DESA, 2022).

The magnitude of the war's effects on the continent is expected to be country-specific, and affect countries with more trading ties. In sum, many African countries trade with the Russian Federation and Ukraine. Maghreb countries (Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia) are the largest importers from the Russian Federation, and Ukraine, followed by Nigeria, Ethiopia, Senegal, Uganda, Kenya and South Africa. Hence, these countries are expected to be the most afflicted by the war in the medium term (AMIS, 2022). With the unfolding of the war that could last for months or more, African countries are urged to anticipate the effects in their economies. This also implies the need to diversify the markets, build stocks, strengthen regional blocks, and particularly increase intra-African trade to move products within the continent.

Impact of Russia–Ukraine War on Economic Growth in Africa

The war has led to an increase in energy and food prices. Russia is the third largest oil producer, and the price of Brent oil has increased by 25% since the onset of the war. Oil-producing countries such as Angola, Nigeria, South Sudan, Congo, and Gabon stand to benefit from increased demand and higher global oil prices, as European countries search for alternative energy sources. This could have a positive effect on their growth prospects, fiscal balances, current account positions, and reserves. However, African countries will need to improve the management of these windfall gains. The current practice of forward sale of oil and significant mandatory payments will determine the net gains. For Africa's hydrocarbon exporters, the increase in oil prices is both a gain and a loss. While exports, foreign exchange earnings/reserves, and government revenue are likely to increase, this could be offset by the increased cost of refined petroleum imports - emphasizing the urgency in value addition and industrialization on the continent. Furthermore, the practice of subsidizing petrol, diesel and kerosene will further worsen their fiscal and financial positions (Chukwuemeka, & Ernest, 2025).

Longer term growth opportunities for gas-rich African countries

African countries can benefit from increased demand as European countries gradually reduce their dependence on Russian gas. Several countries, including Algeria, Tanzania, Senegal, Nigeria, and Mozambique have significant reserves of offshore and non-offshore gas. Tanzania, for instance, anticipates USD 30 billion in foreign investment to kick-start the construction of offshore liquefied natural gas projects in 2023, while Senegal aims to exploit the 40 trillion cubic feet of natural gas that was discovered between 2014 and 2017. Algeria, Niger and Nigeria have already signed a 13-billion-dollar agreement to develop the Trans-Saharan gas pipeline. The United States has announced its potential to supply Europe with an additional 15 billion cubic meters of liquefied natural gas (LNG) in 2022, which represents 10% of the gas that the 27 EU members buy from Russia (The Daily Telegraph, 2022). In the medium term, this figure could rise to 50 billion cubic meters per year and allow Europeans to do without a third of their Russian imports. Europe will still have to search for new providers to fill the remaining two-thirds gap which Africa is well positioned to fill.

Costly oil imports

The war is already driving up oil prices at the pump, with adverse effects on transportation costs and households' budgets. This trend is likely to continue in the short-term, as the prices of refined petroleum products such as petrol, diesel, aviation fuel, kerosene, and lubricating oil increase. Most African countries are particularly vulnerable, especially because of their over-dependence on limited sources and their lack of competitiveness in global markets. The direct impacts of the crisis in Africa include trade disruption, food and fuel price spikes, macroeconomic instability, and security challenges. The crisis pushed the price of a barrel of Brent oil above the $100 dollar mark for the first time since 2014. At the same time, food grain prices continued to rise even higher as supply disruptions from Russia and Ukraine (actual and anticipated) rocked global markets. Food and fuel account for over one-third of the consumer price index in most African countries. The pass-through of consequent inflation will be swift and hard-hitting, especially for vulnerable groups like women and children.

Economic growth

The Russia-Ukraine crisis could jeopardize the continent's prospects for economic recovery through indirect channels such as disruption in energy supplies, inflationary pressures and increased savings. Recent estimates show that global demand could decrease by 3%, while global inflation increases by 4%. Given historical trends, African exports are forecast to grow by 4.1% in 2022, as opposed to 8.3% if the war did not occur. As increased n inflation will reduce consumption, lower global growth and in turn the demand for African exports. Additionally, production shocks are likely to affect economic growth due to increased energy and transport costs. Businesses will bear the cost of rising energy prices and could experience severe difficulties.

Ghana imports 60% of its iron ore and steel from Ukraine, 25% of its wheat from Russia, and 17.6% of fertilizer from Russia. Tanker delivery costs, for instance, doubled between February 23 and March 3, 2022. In Sierra Leone, the increase in the price of fuel (20%) has increased the cost of local transport by 50%. Some African regions, such as West Africa are already facing additional challenges such as uncertainties relating to COVID-19 and insecurity.

There are also indirect impacts of the crisis to consider, which include imported inflation, difficult energy transitions, and a potential geopolitical realignment (Glauber, & Laborde, 2022). To fully diversify, Europe will have to search for new providers to fill the remaining two thirds gap. Africa’s gas producers, like Algeria, Libya and Nigeria, are well positioned to fill this gap. But there are two immediate

consequences of the increase in the global demand for oil and gas. First, it could undermine progress towards ensuring a just transition to sustainable energy sources which are much more environmentally friendly. Second, it could limit the continent’s access to natural gas in the near-term as African countries export their gas supplies to Europe.

Heighten the risks of a debt crisis

The impact of the war could push Africa into serious debt distress, making countries less likely to meet their debt obligations. It could also increase inequality because high food and fuel prices typically hit the most vulnerable households hardest. Reduced access to electricity and cooking fuel would make more households poor, while shrinking budgets may trigger households to dispose of their assets, thus reducing their ability to cushion themselves from future shocks. Overall, these indirect effects would constrain overall economic activity and could trigger social tensions and unrest. Most African countries were implementing protective social policies to support vulnerable populations during the COVID-19 pandemic. The current inflationary spiral triggered by the crisis in Russia and Ukraine is likely to make countries, which were already near debt distress, less able to make timely debt service obligations.

Additionally, as the war affects inflation and economic activity, global interest rates are likely to rise. This could worsen Africa's debt position, particularly in countries whose debt repayments are due in 2022 and 2023. Moreover, an increase in domestic interest rates will have a negative effect on both domestic debt service payments and the capacity of Small and Medium Sized Enterprises (SMEs) to borrow. Some African countries, including Zambia and Nigeria, are undergoing post-COVID-19 debt negotiations with the IMF and will have to find alternative resources to stabilize their debt positions.

An acceleration of inflation

Increased inflation constitutes a key macroeconomic risk. The destabilization of global supply chains and production processes has already triggered an increase in prices which has led to renewed attention to inflation. Increased inflation due to higher global prices of energy, food and raw materials is likely to reduce households' consumption, income and savings. This will also have an effect on public expenditures as governments try to support populations by maintaining energy prices at an affordable level. Nigeria, Tanzania, Ghana, Sierra Leone and Zimbabwe have already announced significant fuel price increases. Retail prices have remained stable in recent weeks despite what is by definition an oil shock, but it is difficult to imagine this trend holding up without even more governmental interventions and price controls going forward.

3. METHODOLOGY

This research mainly relies on secondary source of data collection. This shows that the use of library and other educational resource centres were utilized. In other words, the study made use of textbooks, journals, magazines, newspapers, reports, seminars, symposia, and internet services.

4. DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

In the light of the data gathered for this study, finding showed that the Russia-Ukraine war has increase the level of poverty and hunger in most Africa countries. The war bring devastating economic consequences on the continent, including increased hunger and poverty, given the continent's high dependency on food imports, rising global food prices, and low agricultural productivity. The war places indirect increase poverty in Africa through three phases. First, most households devote a relatively high share of their expenditure to food relative to other countries. This suggests that rather than focusing on sustainability, electricity, and economic transformation, most households are preoccupied with survival.

Second, the war widens inequality because high food and fuel prices hit the most vulnerable households. Increased poverty and inequality would not only reduce overall economic activity but also trigger social tensions and hunger. Third, due to increased oil prices, the war deprived households of basic amenities such as food, electricity and cooking fuel, and thus increase multidimensional poverty in African countries. To protect themselves from these adverse effects, households may result to disposing of their assets, which make them vulnerable to other shocks. Countries that are highly dependent on food and fuel imports are the most vulnerable to increases in hunger. Africa reliance on Russia and Ukraine imports for both food and raw materials makes them particularly vulnerable to the impacts of Russia’s invasion. As the conflict between Russia and Ukraine persists, Africa countries may be affected in terms of capital importation and some foods imported from these countries. According to the National Bureau of Statistics, (NBS) Nigeria has received $84.4 million in capital imports between 2019-2022.

Based on the above aforementioned shows that in April 2022, the Nigeria Baker Association announced 50 per cent increase in the price of bread, which was expected to take effect from May, 2022. This is because the wheat used in baking bread in Nigeria is imported from Russia and Ukraine. It is not only the prices of wheat that has increased in the last four months due to the war in Eastern Europe, like the price of milk, also imported from Ukraine and Russia has increased. For instance, a 400g of powdered Peak Milk tin which used to sell for N1,150 ($2.55), is now increased to N2,390 ($5.31). Similarly, on food security as a response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the international community has imposed sanctions on Russia while many economic activities including food production have been halted in Ukraine. Also, Ukrainian seaports have been bombed and damage to the point that export of goods from the Eastern European country to other parts of the world is inhibited. Image an estimated 13.5 million tons of wheat and 16 million tons of maize are frozen in the two countries, about 23 and 43 per cent of their expected exports in 2021/2022.

It was observed that fuel importation in countries like Tanzania, Nigeria, and Burkina Faso account for more than 20% of total imports while food imports account for around 35-40% of imports in Benin and Gambia while countries such as Senegal are highly dependent on both food and fuel imports, and are particularly susceptible to an increase in poverty levels. This finding is consisted with the opinion of Greenville, Kawasaki, Jouanjean, (2019) stated that Russia invasion has direct effect on food prices and hunger which also have spillover effects, as some land-locked African countries rely on neighboring countries that are tied to the Russia-Ukraine markets. For instance, South Sudan is highly dependent on imported food supplies from Uganda and Kenya. Between 2012-2019 it imported about $253 million (48% of total imports) in Uganda and $30 million (30% of total imports) in Kenya. Rising food prices, notably cereal (wheat and maize) in source markets will negatively affect domestic prices in South Sudan, thus increasing inflation, food insecurity and humanitarian needs (estimated at $1.5 billion or 30% of GDP).

In the course of this study it was disclosed that Russia invasion would latterly worsening African economic conditions. As commodity prices and fuel inflation increase, consumption expenditures will decline. This would lower African economic growth and, in turn, reduce aggregate demand for African exports. Weaker demand for African exports will likely slow down economic growth in many countries, further reducing individual's incomes and utilizing public resources for poverty reduction measures. Consequences, food supply from Russia and Ukraine, the war will decrease food supply in most African countries, there are particularly vulnerable to their heavy reliance on imports from Russia and Ukraine. Other countries that import significant amounts of wheat from Russia include Benin, Cabo Verde, Mauritania, Senegal, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Ghana, Nigeria, Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Mali, and

Liberia. This finding is in line with finding of Tanchum (2022) who revealed that in 2021 African countries imported USD 4 billion worth of agricultural products from Russia, roughly 90% of which was wheat. Russia accounted for 30% of global wheat production and 80% of vegetable oil exported.

Countries like Mozambique and Angola are facing moderate risk with less dependency in food imports. Furthermore, rising oil prices will also increase competition and demand for sugar cane/beet (for ethanol production) – which is one of Nigeria's top imported agricultural products.

As a result, Nigeria's sugar industries and products made with sugar could suffer from higher prices, which will likely be passed and suffered by consumers.

Finding revealed that the stability, peace and security risk in Africa, over the period 2014-2019, Russia supplied 49% of the weapons sold to Africa. It also accounted for 20% of arms sales between 2011-2020. Countries such as Algeria, Egypt, Sudan, Angola, and Nigeria are the major importers of Russian arms. Russia recently supplies arms to Nigeria that face difficulties in purchasing arms from United States due to human rights concerns.

5. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The consequences of Russia's invasion of Ukraine are not limited to Ukraine and Europe countries. Many developing countries rely on Ukraine and Russia for vital food importation, without which they face severe shortages. The war is affecting the movement of food products within Ukraine and exports to major trading partners. The disruption to grain exports from the Black Sea region are significantly impacting on food import-dependent countries that rely on food imports from Russia and Ukraine particularly on developing countries. There is need for African countries involve and address the global fallouts of the conflict disruptions in supply activities from the Black sea region. This involves not only addressing the immediate issue of unblocking global food supplies currently stuck in Ukrainian ports, but also implementing measures today that will ease the long-term impacts of the crisis. This would give opportunity for African countries to deepen intra-Africa regional food trade to meet domestic food consumption needs.

Recommendations

The following recommendations were made for the study to address both short-term and long-term measures:

1. To facilitate better coordination on food trade, the current crisis is laying bare the importance of trade coordination, not protectionism, and should be used a springboard to implement initiatives such as the African Continental Free Trade Area, which encourage a diversification of import sources and intra-regional trade.
2. Supporting local food production, facilitating smallholders' access to fertilizers produced and stocked locally by promote good agricultural practices to improve nutrient use, in particular the adoption of improved seeds by farmers.
3. Adopt a distribution mechanism of Hydrocarbon products that is effective, to curtail the cases of diversion of the petroleum products and running a regular functional refinery.
4. African governments should ensure a transparent and predictable agriculture policy environment to boost domestic agriculture production investments. This will strengthen regional integration and cooperation through intra-Africa agricultural trade. This is an opportunity for African countries to deepen intra-Africa regional food trade to meet domestic food consumption needs.
5. African countries need to diversify their imported food sources, including strengthening regional food trade opportunities. Ensuring functional strategic food reserves is critical for countries in Africa to stabilize their food supplies and prices to support the domestic food availability and affordability.

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